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Abstract
We experience the world serially rather than simultaneously. A century of research on human and nonhuman animals has
suggested that the first experience in a series of two or more is cognitively privileged. We report three experiments
designed to test the effect of first position on implicit preference and choice using targets that range from individual humans
and social groups to consumer goods. Experiment 1 demonstrated an implicit preference to buy goods from the first
salesperson encountered and to join teams encountered first, even when the difference in encounter is mere seconds. In
Experiment 2 the first of two consumer items presented in quick succession was more likely to be chosen. In Experiment 3
an alternative hypothesis that first position merely accentuates the valence of options was ruled out by demonstrating that
first position enhances preference for the first even when it is evaluatively negative in meaning (a criminal). Together, these
experiments demonstrate a ‘‘first is best’’ effect and we offer possible interpretations based on evolutionary mechanisms of
this ‘‘bound’’ on rational behavior and suggest that automaticity of judgment may be a helpful principle in clarifying
previous inconsistencies in the empirical record on the effects of order on preference and choice.
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Introduction
You walk into a room and first meet Maxine, then Max.
In a grocery store, your eyes first notice Bosc pears, then Bartlett pears.
Your stockbroker first tells you about a new stock option Bentametrix,
then Mentametrix.
In these examples, as in so much of life, information is
experienced sequentially. What is the effect of an item’s position
on preference for it? There is no reason, at least not a rational one,
for preference to be guided by the order in which two items in a
series are encountered. Max and Maxine are equally likely to be
good people, until we know otherwise; Bartlett pears are no less
good than Bosc, but depend on the recipe; and Mentametrix is just
as likely to be a smart stock choice as the alternative–in the
absence of other information.
It is inherent in the nature of experience, unfolding as it does in
time, to encounter events sequentially [1]. Choices and prefer-
ences, if they are to maximize subjective expected utilities, ought to
be based on rational dimensions of choice such as the quality and
value of the object but not on the position in which the option was
encountered. However, as the last half-century of research on
judgment and decision making has shown, judgments and
decisions made under uncertainty are boundedly rational [2–6]
The Power of Primacy
In humans and other animals, we know that primacy has power
with undue emphasis placed on the first instance that is
encountered. What is experienced first is remembered better [7–
10], it drives attachment more strongly [11–13], creates stronger
association with the self [14], influences impressions more
decisively [15–18], and persuades more effectively [19–21].
Literally gravitating toward the first physical object encountered
appears to be present in the earliest forms of attachment across
species. For example, research on the imprinting process in baby
chicks shows that the first object the newborn sees–whether it be
another animal or inanimate object–is more likely to become the
object of attachment [11]. In adult humans, we know that the first
argument presented on even complex topics has greater persuasive
appeal and is more likely to change minds [19].
Although first seems to exert influence in such moments, little is
known about the choices that adult humans make of everyday
people, objects, and events and the role of first position. In fact, in
work with adult humans, results are sometimes mixed [19]. We
propose that judgments that are relatively devoid of conscious
awareness will consistently reveal an effect in which firsts are
considered best because firsts are privileged for several–very basic–
reasons that heuristic processes may rely on. In particular, it is
possible that the evidence which does exist on psychological
processes close to attachment and preference may show an even
more robust effect if the method by which preferences are elicited
can circumvent conscious awareness by reliance upon automatic
rather than deliberative cognitive processes. Thus, the goal of the
current report was to directly test whether firsts would be
consistently preferred on automatic measures of preference and
choice–even when firsts may or may not be preferred on
deliberative measures of preference and choice.
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Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we tested the ‘‘first is best’’ hypothesis using
three different pairs of stimuli: two male salespersons, two female
salespersons, and two teams. Participants were given each of the
items of a pair in sequence and then participants indicated their
preference.
Method
Participants and procedure. One hundred twenty-three
participants were presented with three different choice-pairs and
then probed for preference after each pair. Participants were
introduced to a pair of teams they may wish to join (the ‘‘Hadleys’’
and the ‘‘Rodsons’’), a pair of male salespersons from whom they
may purchase a car (‘‘Jim’’ and ‘‘Jon’’), and a pair of female
salespersons from whom they may purchase a car (‘‘Lisa’’ and
‘‘Lori’’). Four photos of each individual (e.g., 4 different photos of
‘‘Lisa’’) and 4 different team member names (e.g., 4 different
members of the ‘‘Hadley’’ team) were shown for a total of 24
stimuli. Team-member names were balanced for word-length and
letter-usage and faces were balanced within pair for attractiveness
and emotional expression. Each option within a pair was
presented sequentially for 30-seconds and participants were forced
to maximally consider both options. Immediately after each
choice-pair was presented, participants completed a measure
which assessed automatic preference for each option (an Implicit
Association Test, or IAT) [22]. Self-reported preference was also
measured. Order of choice-pairs was randomized as was which
option was presented first. All of this research (Experiments 1–3)
was approved by the human subjects review board at Harvard
University. Written and signed informed consent was obtained
from participants in Experiments 1 and 3 and verbal consent was
obtained from the field participants in Experiment 2.
Preference measures. The measure of automatic preference
was an evaluative IAT for each choice-pair. In these tests, each
category label–in this case, team names and salespersons–were
paired with ‘‘Better’’ and ‘‘Worse.’’ For example, the IAT assessed
the degree to which Lisa versus Lori (and also Jim vs. Jon and
Hadleys vs. Rodsons) were spontaneously associated with positive
and negative attributes, with order of first paired block (Lisa +
Better; Lori + Worse) counterbalanced. The difference in average
response latency to the paired blocks was divided by the pooled SD
yielding an index of implicit preference for one person (or team)
versus the other (the score is known as a D-score) [22]. In the
IATs, the items for the salespersons were 4 photographs of each
individual or team. The items for ‘‘Better’’ and ‘‘Worse’’ were
roughly synonyms for the words (e.g., wonderful, best; horrible,
worst).
Deliberative, self-reported preference was measured with: (a) a
7-point scale labeled ‘‘I strongly prefer Lisa to Lori,’’ to ‘‘I strongly
prefer Lori to Lisa’’; (b) two ‘‘feeling thermometers’’ of Lisa and
Lori preference from 0 (cold) –100 (warm); the difference between
the two thermometers was z-scored and averaged with the z-
scored 7-point rating item (all option-pairs were rated on these self-
reported items). Both self-report and implicit measures contained a
midpoint of zero indicating no preference. Order of preference-
measures (implicit vs. explicit) was counterbalanced.
Results and Discussion
Repeated measures ANOVA across choice-pairs revealed a
main effect of primacy on automatic preference. Automatic
preference for first items presented was compared with automatic
preference for second items presented (across choice-pairs:
Hadleys & Rodsons, Jim & Jon, and Lisa & Lori). Regardless of
the actual option, the one presented first compared to the one
presented next was significantly more strongly associated with the
concept ‘‘better’’ rather than ‘‘worse’’, F(1, 121) = 20.20, p,.001;
effect size r= .38 (Figure 1). There was no difference in self-
reported preference for firsts versus seconds, F(1, 121) = .08,
p= .78.
Experiment 2
The IAT is a very particular kind of test of automatic
preference, and in Experiment 2 we introduced a different and
more realistic measure of preference in the form of a direct choice
of a consumer good. When choosing between two pieces of
similarly packaged and flavored bubble gum, we either (a) imposed
upon participants a time constraint that forced a spontaneous and
immediate decision, or (b) allowed a deliberative choice with more
time available. Consumer items varied in no way other than serial
position; choice of gum was the dependent variable.
Method
Participants and procedure. Two-hundred seven partici-
pants were recruited from a train station in Boston, MA. Adults
sitting alone were approached by an experimenter who was blind
to the hypothesis. Participants were asked to participate in a study
on consumer choice (,1% declined). For remuneration they were
offered the small consumer item they chose. Two pieces of similar-
looking bubblegum (1 piece of ‘‘Bubble Yum’’ and 1 piece of
‘‘Bubblicious;’’ equal in size and shape) were placed sequentially
on a white clipboard. First placement of gum brand and side of
clipboard (left vs. right) were counterbalanced. After rapid
sequential placement of the two items, participants reached out
and grabbed (and kept) their choice.
In the rapid decision task participants were instructed to make
their selection fast ‘‘within one second or so’’ whereas in the
deliberative decision task they were instructed to select ‘‘after you
have thought about it.’’
Results and Discussion
A 262 x2 tested the effect of order (first vs. second) on choice for
each deliberation condition (automatic vs. controlled) separately.
Consistent with results from Experiment 1, participants in the
rapid decision task chose the chewing gum presented first (62%)
significantly more often than the gum presented second (38%)
Figure 1. The effect of presentation order on automatic
preference for Hadleys/Rodsons, Jim/Jon, and Lisa/Lori. Higher
scores indicate a preference for Hadleys, Jim, and Lisa (vs. Rodsons, Jon,
and Lori); lower scores indicate a preference for Rodsons, Jon, and Lori
(vs. Hadleys, Jim, and Lisa). Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035088.g001
First Is Best
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whereas, participants in the deliberative choice condition were
equally as likely to choose the gum presented first (51%) or second
(49%): X2(df=1, N=113) = 6.53, p,.02; effect size r= .24
(Figure 2).
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that firsts are preferred when the
choice bypasses deliberative thought across several target domains
(individuals, groups, consumer goods) using two measures of
preference (the IAT and simple choice). In all cases, preferences
were obtained in the automatic choice condition and not in the
more consciously controllable response. However, both Experi-
ments 1 and 2 leave open a possibility that challenges the ‘‘first is
best’’ hypothesis: It is possible that the first item in a pair does not
engender greater preference but a more extreme evaluative
response to whatever the existing valence of that object. In
Experiments 1 and 2, the stimuli were mildly or extremely positive
objects and the observed effect may simply reflect an enhancement
of existing valence. In other words, had the first item been
obviously aversive, the result could be a stronger negative reaction
to the first, resulting in a choice of the second. Experiment 3 was
conducted to test this alternative explanation of polarization.
Experiment 3
We measured automatic preference for negatively valenced
options: two criminals convicted of violent crimes. If ‘‘first is best,’’
the first criminal presented should be seen as more worthy of parole;
if polarization is the effect, the first criminal presented should be
viewed as less worthy of parole.
Method
Participants and procedure. Two criminals’ photographs,
from the Florida Department of Corrections website (www.dc.
state.fl.us), were used. Photos depicted 29 year-old males known to
have committed the same violent crimes. Criminals were wearing
identical correctional facility outfits; photos were pre-tested to be
equally attractive and both expressing neutral facial expressions.
The two photos were selected from a larger pool of 17 photos
taken from the same website. Two coders (D. R. C. and B. M.)
coded all photos for (1) facial expression from 23 (extremely negative)
to +3 (extremely positive), and (2) attractiveness from 23 (extremely
unattractive) to +3 (extremely attractive). The two photos for which the
two coders were in 100% agreement were selected for use.
Thirty-one participants learned that evidence suggests people
can make accurate judgments of others after limited exposure to
them and were asked to evaluate two criminals and to determine
who should ‘‘stay in jail’’ versus ‘‘be released on parole.’’
Participants were shown two criminals, one after the other (order
of photos was counterbalanced across participants). Immediately
upon seeing the faces of the criminals (named Jim and Jon), a
measure of automatic preference assessed participants’ speed of
associating Jim and Jon with ‘‘Worse for Parole’’ and ‘‘Better for
Parole’’ using the same procedure as in Experiment 1. Self-
reported preference was also measured.
Results and Discussion
Even when the stimuli were evaluatively negative (imprisoned
criminals convicted of violent crimes) and the judgment called for was
evaluatively negative (who should remain in prison?), participants
automatically associated the first criminal with being more worthy
of parole (rather than prison) compared to the second criminal.
Regardless of which photo was presented first, it was the one
presented first who was judged to be more worthy of parole, F(1,
29) = 4.31, p,.05; effect size r= .36 (Figure 3). Replicating
Experiments 1 and 2, no effects were observed on self-reported
preference. On the self-reported measure of preference the means
were consistent with those of the implicit results: When Jim was
seen first he was preferred for parole over Jon (M= .25) and when
Jon was shown first he was preferred over Jim (M=2.21).
However, this effect was not statistically significant: F(1, 29)
= 1.88, p..18.
General Discussion
In three experiments, with tests using options from five different
social and consumer-item categories (female salespeople, male
salespeople, teams, pieces of gum, and criminals), we obtained a
consistent result that on a deep, automatic level of human
cognition, firsts are consistently preferred and chosen. Despite the
research demonstrating how firsts influence many aspects of
human and animal cognition, the six published reports on adult
humans testing the effect of order on preference have reported
somewhat mixed results [4,17,23–26].
Mantonakis et al. attempted to explain the mixed results by
advancing the idea that expertise moderates the effect of primacy
on preference. They argued that expert knowledge and deliber-
ation about options trump locally available heuristics such as
order. While their account does explain their own and some
others’ findings, it does not explain why Bruine de Bruin’s work
[23,24], Li and Epley [25], and Nisbett and Ross [4] sometimes
found no effect of order and/or other times recency effects. The
Figure 2. The effect of presentation order on actual choice for
bubblegum presented first versus second.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035088.g002
Figure 3. The effect of presentation order on automatic
preference for Jim the criminal versus Jon the criminal. Higher
scores indicate a preference for Jim (vs. Jon); lower scores indicate a
preference for Jon (vs. Jim). Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035088.g003
First Is Best
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expertise account alone also doesn’t explain the results from the
three experiments presented here.
We tested whether firsts would show direct effects on preference
and choice using measures of automatic and deliberative cognition
and in all three experiments our results suggest it is on measures of
automatic cognition that firsts may deliver their impact more
consistently. In retrospect, that is probably why existing research,
mainly with non-humans, showed an early and automatic
tendency to prefer firsts; later work with adult humans which
sometimes produced mixed results may have simply been a result
of mixed methods, both automatic and controlled, being utilized.
Although such a conclusion from the review of existing research
may have been possible, it is experiments that use both forms of
measuring preferences that can be most convincing. Consistent
with our results and the theoretical argument advanced by
Mantonakis et al. [26], we propose that judgments that are
relatively devoid of conscious awareness will consistently reveal an
effect in which firsts are considered best because firsts are
privileged for several reasons that heuristic processes may rely
on. We note here that accounts of satisficing are consistent with
our notion of an automatic preference for firsts–however we refer
to automatic preferences resting below the reaches of introspective
access and fully developed only after maximizing – in other words,
only after both options have been fully presented and considered.
It may well be that a preference for firsts has its origins in an
evolutionary adaptation favoring firsts. Research on filial imprint-
ing in non-human animals suggests that attachment to the first
may have evolved as an adaptive mechanism to help organisms
rapidly discriminate between those entities that are safe versus
dangerous [11]. Research on humans’ innate preparedness to
prefer their own (mother, family, social group), which is also the
one encountered first, may account for the potential adaptive
utility of a preference for primacy. A primacy effect on preference
may have derived from positivity attributed to first experiences not
leading to harm. Automatic measures of preference are able to tap
into these more primitive human systems which is why the
primacy effect can be consistently harvested using such measures.
It may also be that a primacy effect on preference evolved from
observations of phenomena like ‘‘pecking order’’ (we thank Joshua
Greene for this suggestion). The animal that has alpha status gets
to eat first, the person of highest privilege in a family or group is
served first (kings, fathers, guests). Perhaps a preference for the first
conferred an advantage leading a preference for first to have been
a quality favored in natural selection.
In contrast, when controlled processing is possible, other
influences can (as they rationally should) override the automatic
reliance on the first. This is both the discovery of the present
experiments and it also may explain the sometimes mixed
outcomes of previous research.
As a pointer to the mechanism by which firsts may have their
power, we note that research on comparative judgments shows
that whatever is set as the ‘‘gold standard’’ against which others
are compared is itself strongly preferred [27,28]. Although order
effects have not been shown to account for direction of comparison
findings [27], the basic thrust of this and related work on similarity
judgments [29,30] suggests that firsts may automatically be viewed
as the gold standard against which others are to be compared.
Future research will involve further tests of the generality of this
phenomenon in different samples and species because such tests
are crucial to understanding the nature of this surprising and
seemingly important effect. If some of the above speculations are
correct, this effect should emerge in infants and young children, as
well as in other primates and animals–regardless of whether
deliberation was ‘‘allowed’’ or not. Likewise, tests are needed to
unlink this primacy effect from other primacy producing results.
For example, disambiguating this result from primacy effects in
memory can be conducted by having later items in a series
repeated more often (to enhance recency) and test whether even
under such conditions a preference for first is retained (we thank
Jonathan Schooler for this suggestion). Two of our tests
(Experiments 1 and 3) were optimized to yield recency effects
because when forced to maximally consider all options people tend
to choose the most recent item; thus, Experiments 1 and 3 served
as extremely conservative tests of our hypothesis (we thank an
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out). However, additional
tests utilizing paradigms more traditionally optimized to reveal
recency (e.g., time delays between first and second options as is the
case in persuasion research) should examine whether recency
effects are an emergent property of only deliberative cognition–
perhaps an indirect measure (such as those used in the three
experiments presented here) would demonstrate primacy while
self-report measures continue to reveal recency. In the meantime,
decision theorists would do well to build in tests of ‘‘first is best’’ in
research that will teach us about the impact, boundary conditions
and mechanisms of the automatic preference for firsts observed
here.
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